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BAR BRIEFS
the United States will retain such conquered islands as are neces-
sary to our future protection. Being perhaps a little more civil-
ized, or a little more sensitive of the right of self-determination
of other peoples, we shall probably retain only infinitesimal bits
of territory and such as are suitable for air and naval bases.
Some of our allies, seeing no virtue in such self-restraint, will
consider it appropriate to retain whole countries or parts of coun-
tries, either on the assertion of military or economic necessity or
on that other delusion which has caused so much grief to the
world, that at some ancient time the newly-acquired territory was
part of the fatherland. And such lack of restraint on their part
will sow seeds which in due time will mature into causes for an-
other world war, unless education in national self-restraint and
national generosity toward lesser nations develops through the
organization now projected. Whether the peace which follows
this war will be a real peace or merely another long armistice will
depend primarily on the will for peace among the people of Russia,
Britain and the United States, for I assume this time we will be
realistic enough not to furnish our present enemies with the
means to re-arm.
(Continued in next issue)
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In John Bredeson, Administrator of the Estate of Roselle Bredeson,
Deceased, Pltf. and Applt., vs. Truesdell Warren, Deft. and Respt.
That where the the Supreme Court deems such course necessary to the
accomplishment of justice, it will remand the case for retrial in the district
court, even though a trial de novo is demanded in the Supreme Court.
That for reasons stated in the opinion, this case is remanded for a new
trial in the district court.
From a judgment of the District Court of.Grank Forks County, Englert,
J., Plaintiff appeals. REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. Opinion of the
Court by Broderick, District Judge, sitting in the place of Morris, J., dis-
qualified.
In Emelie Muhlhauser, et al., Applts., vs. Selma Becker and George
Gappert, Apps.
That where parties claim to be entitled to the estate of an intestate
decedent, under a contract made by the decedent to adopt them as his chil-
dren and where no statutory adoption proceedings were had, the remedy
of said parties to establish their right to the estate is in a court of equity
in an action to determine the validity and extent of the contract.
That where, during settlement of the estate of an intestate decedent,
claimants appear in the county court asserting their right to the estate
under such a contract made for their benefit by the decedent, it is error
for the county court to attempt to determine the rights arising under such
contract, as the county court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine
actions or proceedings inequity.
That where an appeal is taken to the district court from the judgment
of the county court in a matter not within the jurisdiction of that court to
hear and determine, and on the appeal appellants specifically raise this
want of jurisdiction of the county court ever the subject matter, it is error
for the district court to overrule the objection of the appellants to the
jurisdiction of the county court. In such case it is the duty of the district
court to sustain the appeal and reverse the decision of the county court.
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That where an appeal is taken to this court from a judgment of the
district court, which appeal is based solely on the claim that the judgment
of the district court is not sustained by the findings of the trial court, the
record will be examined to determine the issue raised, and when the
record shows the-judgment rendered is based on erroneous conclusions
drawn from the findings of the trial court, the judgment will be reversed.
Appeal from the District Court of Morton County, Hon. R. G. Mc-
Farland, Special, Judge. REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, J.
Burke and Nuessle, J. concur specially.
In Emelie Muhlhauser, et al, Applts., vs. Selma Becker and George
Gappert, Applts.
That the county court has no power to remove a duly appointed ad-
ministrator and to substitute another in his place without due notice to
the administrator and to those interested in the estate.
That on the trial of an action in the district court, where the district
court is required to make findings of fact, such findings are to be stated
separately from the conclusions of law, should include in the one document
all of the facts found by the court and should not attempt to include facts
determined in another document, such as the memorandum opinion, by
mere reference thereto and in this manner make the memorandum opinion
a part of the findings of fact. Appeal from the District Court of Morton
County, Hon. R. G. McFarland, Special Judge. MODIFIED AND AF-
FIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, J.
In State of North Dakota ex rel. Nels G. Johnson, Attorney General, Pltf.
and Peter. vs. C. J. Myers, Deft. and Respt.
That the Supreme Court will exercise the original jurisdiction conferred
on it by Section 87 of the Constitution in cases where the sovereignty of
the state, its franchises-and prerogatives are involved, judging for itself in
each case whether that particular case is within its jurisdiction.
That the issues involved in this proceeding affect the sovereignty and
prerogatives of the state and an immediate determination of the contro-
versy is necessary for the maintenance of the ordinary processes of gov-
ernment. Accordingly it is a proper case for the exercise of the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto.
That a public office is a public position to which a portion of the sov-
ereignty of the country attaches for the time being, and which is exercised
for the benefit of the public.
That the office of Manager of the State Hail Insurance Department is a
public office.
That the statutory provision that "the commissioner of insurance, with
the approval of the governor, shall appoint a manager" of the State Hail
Insurance Department is not an unconstitutional limitation upon the ap-
pointive powers of the Commissioner of Insurance nor does it confer powers
other than executive powers upon the Governor.
That an officer appointed to serve at the will of the appointing power,
or an officer appointed for a fixed term who continues to serve after the
expiration of his term without a reappointment is in the absence of any
constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, subject to summary
removal from office by the appointing power without notice and without
cause.
That impeached officer, prohibited by the constitution and statutes from
exercising the duties of his office after impeachment and before acquittal
is temporarily stripped of all of the powers of his office.
That officer appointed in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 44-0908,
R. C. 1943, to perform the duties of an impeached officer until the close of
the impeachment trial is, during his tenure, vested with all of the powers
of the office.
230 BAR BRIEFS
Original proceeding upon a writ of quo warranto. JUDGMENT OF
OUSTER ORDERED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J. Morris, J.,
dissents.
In Pierce Township of Barnes County, North Dakota; a public corpora-
tion, Pltf. and Applt., vs. Alfred Ernie, Deft. and Respt.
That a township does not possess powers not specifically provided by law
except those necessary to the exercise of powers enumerated in or granted
by the statutes.
That townships are bodies corporate and the rights of townships which
flow from the powers granted by statue are determined according to the
rules of law applicable to municipal corborations.
That where a township board has purchased real estate for the township
by a consummated transaction which exceeded authority of the board, the
fact that the transaction was ultra vires does not prevent title from pass-
ing to the township.
That where a public corporation has power to acquire and hold real
estate a stranger may not attach collaterally a transaction by which such
property was acquired on the ground that it was ultra vires.
That a purchaser of real property who has brought to his attention facts
which should have put him on inquiry which, if pursued with due diligence,
would have led to knowledge of a prior purchase of the same property by
another, is not a purchaser in good faith within the meaning of Sec.
47-1941, R. C. 1943.
That in an action to quiet title to real estate the plaintiff must rely upon
the strength of his own title and not upon the weakness of that of his
adversary but such an action will not be defeated by showing that the
plaintiff's interest, otherwise sufficient to support the action, is subject to
possibly superior rights of other parties who are not parties to the suit.
Appeal from the District Court of Barnes County, Hon. Daniel B. Holt,
Judge. REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In Olaf Braatelien, Pltf. and Applt. vs. Emma Burns and J. H. Burns,
Hans K. Haugland, Inter. and Respt.
That Section 7413, Comp. Laws 1913 (Sections 28-0219, 28-0220, 1943 Rev.
Codes) providing that "Any person may before the trial intervene in an
action or proceeding, who has an interest in the matter in litigation, in the
success of either party, or an interest against both * * is to be liberally
construed.
That intervention may be resorted to in any and all actions and at every
stage in the action prior to the commencement of the trial. But as to
whether an application for leave to intervene is timely made, is a matter
within the discretion of the court. If it be timely, the applicant, providing
he can show the requisite interest to come within the terms of the statute,
is entitled to it as a matter of right.
That where a grantee in a deed agrees to assume and pay a mortgage
indebedness on the land conveyed as a part of the purchase price thereof,
the relation of principal and surety as between himself and his grantor is
created.
That where a grantee in a deed has discharged an indebtedness secured
by mortgage upon the land conveyed which he had agreed to assume and
pay as part of the purchase price, and suit is thereafter brought against
the grantor to recover on account of the indebtedness, the grantee has such
an interest in the matter in litigation as will entitle him to intervene.
Appeal from the District Court of Divide County. Gronna, J. Action on
a promissory note. From an order granting leave to a third party to inter-
vene, plaintiff appeals. AFFIRMED. Ori;nion of the Court by Nuessle, J.
